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Central	bank	digital	currency:	the	devil	is	in	the
details
In	the	public	debate	over	central	bank	digital	currencies	(CBDCs),	the	design	is	often	implicitly	assumed	or
overlooked.	We	outline	the	main	CBDC	design	features	and	assess	how	effective	they	are	in	achieving
policymakers’	objectives.
Policy	objectives
CBDC	sponsors’	arguments	can	be	classified	into	three	main	groups.	First	is	the	need	for	a	digital	form	of	central
bank	liability	to	replace	physical	banknotes,	which	are	slowly	becoming	obsolete	in	certain	countries.	In	the	words	of
Sweden’s	central	bank	(Sverige	Riksbank	2018):	“If	the	marginalisation	of	cash	continues,	a	digital	krona,	an	e-
krona,	could	ensure	that	the	general	public	still	has	access	to	a	state-guaranteed	means	of	payment.”	Broadly
speaking,	CBCD	would	provide	a	safe	asset	to	the	general	public	and	foster	financial	stability	(see	Fatás	and
Weder	di	Mauro	2018,	and	Niepelt	2020).
The	second	argument	concerns	the	effectiveness	of	monetary	policy.	While	CBDC	could	strengthen	existing	tools,
it	could	also	open	new	(digital)	channels	by	steering	deposit	interest	rates,	distribute	helicopter	money	or,	in
extreme	cases,	grant	loans	to	the	private	sector.	This	new	toolkit	might	influence	competition	in	the	financial
industry	by	changing	the	set	of	actors	at	play.
The	third	argument	is	more	political.	Issuing	a	CBDC	strengthens	monetary	sovereignty	and	crowds	out	privately-
run	initiatives	(e.g.	see	Niepelt	2019).	For	instance,	the	Bank	of	Japan	is	considering	launching	a	CBDC	to	prevent
the	upcoming	Chinese	one	from	spreading	in	Japan.	Authoritarian	regimes	would	likely	find	CBDCs	an	appealing
opportunity	to	strengthen	their	grasp	over	the	economy	with	potentially	undesirable	outcomes	(e.g.	data	privacy).
CBDC	design
Achieving	these	objectives	hinges	on	the	CBDC	design.	We	draw	two	key	distinctions.	The	first	is	between	token-
based	and	account-based	technologies,	and	the	second	is	between	single-tier	and	two-tier	distribution	systems.
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In	every	payment	transaction,	the	receiver	needs	to	make	sure	that	the	payment	is	legit.	With	a	token-based	CBDC,
she	verifies	the	authenticity	of	the	token,	just	like	with	physical	banknotes.	With	an	account-based	CBDC,	she
verifies	the	identity	of	the	payer	and	whether	she	holds	an	account,	just	like	with	credit	cards.	This	difference	is
significant	because	the	two	models	bear	different	economic	implications.	It	would	be	problematic	for	the	central
bank	to	pay	interests	on	a	token-based	CBDC,	as	it	might	affect	the	value	of	the	token	itself.	Just	like	bonds	with
coupons,	the	value	of	the	token	would	increase	up	to	the	scheduled	interest	payment	and	would	diminish	by	the
payment	amount	right	after.	Another	difference	is	the	possibility	of	offline	payments	and	anonymity.	Token-based
CBDCs	could	be	traded	offline	seamlessly,	while	account-based	transactions	could	not	be	executed	without	the
system	remotely	validating	the	identity	of	the	account	holder	and	her	balance.	While	technical	solutions	can	be
implemented	in	order	to	protect	users’	privacy,	account-based	CBDCs	cannot	allow	for	fully	anonymous
transactions.	However,	hybrid	systems	can	be	put	in	place	with	a	token-based	CBDC	and	a	closed	system	of
certified	accounts,	similarly	to	the	Uruguay	Central	Bank	experiment	of	2018.
The	distribution	channels	is	also	crucial.	In	a	one-tier	system,	the	CBDC	is	distributed	by	the	central	bank,	which
directly	competes	with	the	banking	sector	for	deposits.	This	setup	has	clear	scaling	implications	for	the	central
bank,	which	would	need	a	massive	increase	in	size	and	scope.	Arguably,	such	design	would	pose	the	problem	of
who	is	going	to	supply	credit	and	complementary	financial	services.	This	would	ascribe	additional	power	to	the
central	bank,	that	could	easily	compete	away	private	banks.	Furthermore,	the	central	bank	would	have	full	visibility
on	payment	data,	allowing	it	to	better	calibrate	its	monetary	policies	but	also	posing	privacy	concerns.	Alternatively,
a	two-tier	system	would	involve	some	financial	institutions	(most	likely	banks)	for	the	distribution	of	the	CBDC.	This
would	reduce	the	disintermediation	concerns,	by	allowing	banks	to	compete	on	complementary	financial	products
and	to	maintain	their	customer	base.
Brunnermeir	and	Niepelt	(2019)	argue	that	“the	central	bank	could	pass	the	funds	through	to	commercial	banks,
effectively	leaving	the	environment	for	banks	completely	unchanged”.	This	mechanism	would	be	easy	to	implement
in	a	two-tier	distribution	system,	where	funding	could	be	allocated	by	the	central	bank	according	to	the	CBDC
accounts/wallets	held	by	each	bank’s	customers.	On	the	other	hand,	with	a	one-tier	distribution	system,	such	fund
reallocation	is	non-trivial	as	the	central	bank	would	need	to	come	up	with	a	potentially	arbitrary	criterion.
The	four	baseline	scenarios
One-tier	account-based	CDBC
Loosely	speaking,	this	design	gives	the	greatest	power	to	the	central	bank	and	could	eventually	lead	to	a	quasi-
nationalisation	of	the	banking	sector.	If	the	central	bank	sets	an	interest	rate	on	CBDC	deposits	which	is
comparable	or	higher	than	private	banks’,	it	would	be	extremely	hard	for	them	to	compete.	Arguably,	this	system
significantly	increases	monetary	policy	effectiveness	as	the	central	bank	could,	for	instance,	pay	or	charge	an
interest	rate	directly	on	people’s	accounts.	Potentially,	this	is	the	most	disruptive	(and	unchartered)	solution	and	it
would	require	a	massive	effort	by	the	central	bank	to	be	implemented.	The	central	bank	would	need	to	build	a
client-facing	infrastructure	and	deal	with	the	stability	risks	that	a	deposit	drain	would	pose	on	the	banking	sector.
While	this	setting	is	the	most	direct	way	to	supply	outside	money	to	the	general	public,	it	leaves	many	open
questions.	Will	the	central	bank	start	to	issue	credit?	If	so,	how	would	the	screening	be	carried	out?	Or,	if	it	does
not,	how	would	banks	replace	their	deposit	funding?	Will	the	central	bank	directly	fund	the	banks	with	its	deposits?
If	so,	with	which	criteria?	Furthermore,	who	is	going	to	provide	other	complementary	financial	services	(e.g.
investment	solutions,	credit	cards	etc.)?	Fernández-Villaverde	et	al.	(2020)	focus	on	this	scenario	in	their	recent
paper.
Two-tier	account-based	CDBC
In	this	setting,	banks	would	have	CBDC	accounts	on	their	balance	sheet	(similar	to	the	Chicago	plan/	Vollgeld
initiative).	Concretely,	they	would	offer	a	new	kind	of	account	to	their	clients	along	with	their	private	products.	The
major	difference	between	a	CBDC	account	and	a	standard	bank	account	would	be	that	the	former	is	public	money,
while	the	latter	is	private	money.	Even	though	banks	cannot	leverage	on	CBDC	deposits	to	extend	credit,	they
would	still	be	able	to	supply	complementary	financial	services	to	their	customers.	There	would	still	be	deposit
substitution,	but	the	private	sector	would	have	more	leeway	to	keep/attract	customers.	The	central	bank	could	use
its	CBDC	deposits	to	fund	the	banks,	in	so	influencing	lending	to	the	private	sector.	This	set	up	would	strengthen
monetary	policy	and	discourage	privately-run	digital	currency	initiatives	(e.g.	Libra	Association),	but	not	as	much	as
in	the	one-tier	account-based	scenario.
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One-tier	token-based	CDBC
In	a	one-tier	token-based	design,	the	central	bank	directly	provides	digital	wallets	to	the	general	public.	Paying	an
interest	or	distributing	helicopter	money	would	necessarily	require	certified	personal	accounts	and,	therefore,	a
hybrid	system.	As	tokens	would	be	more	expensive	than	bank	deposits,	it	is	reasonable	to	think	that	users	would
not	keep	more	tokens	than	necessary	for	their	daily	activities,	just	like	with	physical	banknotes	or	online	payment
services	(e.g.	Paypal).	If	this	was	the	case,	the	impact	on	monetary	policy	would	be	marginal	and,	in	normal	times,
interest	paying	bank	deposits	would	still	be	appealing	to	the	public.
Two-tier	token-based	CDBC
This	is	undoubtedly	the	less	disruptive	scenario	as	it	is	the	equivalent	of	having	physical	banknotes	in	a	digital
format.	People	are	already	used	to	purchasing	(aka	withdrawing)	banknotes	from	their	banks	and	a	CBDC	would	be
functionally	identical.	The	tokens	would	be	accounted	on	the	central	bank	balance	sheet	as	coins	and	banknotes
are	today.	In	this	scenario,	commercial	banks	would	offer	digital	safes	for	storing	the	tokens,	complementary
services	and	use	their	customers’	payment	data.	As	per	the	previous	scenario,	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	in
normal	times	people	would	want	to	hold	more	tokens	than	necessary	for	everyday	needs.	It	is	unlikely	that	users
will	store	locally	significant	amounts	of	tokens,	for	instance	on	their	smartphones,	as	they	might	lose	them	with	the
device.	Finally,	it	is	worth	noting	that	with	such	design	it	would	be	possible	to	implement	a	system	of	anonymous
offline	transactions.
Conclusions
While	it	is	hard	to	forecast	how	the	general	public	will	react	to	the	introduction	of	public	digital	money,	in	this	article
we	outline	a	few	baseline	scenarios.	These	four	cases	give	an	idea	of	how	design-dependent	the	implications	of	a
CBDC	may	be.	Token-based	vs	account-based	and	one-tier	vs	two-tier	structures	can	make	the	difference	between
irrelevance	and	a	seriously	disruptive	impact	on	the	banking	sector.	For	these	reasons,	we	argue	that	it	is	always
important	to	specify	which	kind	of	CBDC	design	one	is	assuming,	as	the	devil	lies	in	the	details.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London
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